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LOST IN A DOCTRINAL
WASTELAND: THE
EXCEPTIONALISM OF DOCTOR-





OVER THE YEARS, there have been frequent attempts
by both public and private entities to regulate the content of
doctor-patient speech to advance a particular ideology or ac-
complish an end unrelated to the promotion of patient health.'
At various times since the early 1960s, the federal government
and certain states have restricted physician-patient speech about
contraception and abortion because of ideological opposition to
these practices.2 More recently, managed care organizations
t Associate Professor, City University of New York Law School. J.D., Rutgers Univer-
sity School of Law-Newark, 1982; B.A., Hampshire College, 1977. I would like to thank Gina
Goldstein for her editorial contributions, and Rachel Haynes and Lois Milne for their assistance
with research.
1. This Article uses the term doctor-patient speech to refer to oral communication between
physicians and patients that occurs after the formation of a professional relationship concerning
symptoms, diagnosis, treatment alternatives, and the wide range of subjects that are commonly
discussed in the course of medical decision making.
2. Many cases involving these restrictions have come before the courts. See, e.g.,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (considering a Connecticut statute prohibiting
physicians from counseling patients about contraception and holding that forbidding the use of
contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy); Charles v. Carey,
627 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding unconstitutional [on marital privacy grounds] an Illinois
statute requiring physicians to deliver a written statement to patients stating that the state views a
fetus as a living human being whose life should be preserved). For a more complete description of
these measures, see Paula Berg, Toward a First Amendment Theory of Doctor-Patient Discourse
and the Right to Receive Unbiased Medical Advice, 74 B.U.L. REV. 201, 202-03 n.9, 204 n.13
(1994) [hereinafter Berg] (noting that most courts have struck down statutes that criminalize
physician speech about contraception and abortion on privacy rather than First Amendment
grounds, and listing specific cases that have considered the validity of such statutes).
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have sought to maximize profits and minimize consumer dis-
satisfaction by including "gag clauses" in provider contracts.
These clauses bar physicians from discussing treatment altema-
tives and financial incentive arrangements with patients In
1996, following the November election, federal officials sought
to prevent Californians from exercising their newly won right
to use marijuana for medical purposes4 by threatening to crim-
inally prosecute physicians who discussed this subject with pa-
tients.' Finally, after several juries acquitted Dr. Jack
Kevorkian of criminal charges for illegally assisting patient
suicides, frustrated prosecutors dispatched police to interrupt
his conversations with patients.6
3. In 1996, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) barred Medicare and
Medicaid HMOs from requiring physicians to withhold information about incentive arrangements
and medically necessary treatments from patients. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs:
Requirements for Physician Incentive Plans, 42 C.F.R. § 417.479(a) (1998); Clinton Orders HHS
to Issue Warning Against Gag Rules in Medicaid HMOs, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP. 332, (1997)
(describing HI-IS prohibitions on contractual clauses limiting discussions of treatment options by
physicians in Medicaid and Medicare HMOs). Additionally, during the past few years, many
states have enacted statutes prohibiting managed care organizations from including gag clauses in
their contracts with providers. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE, § 2056.1(b) (West Supp. 1998)
(banning health care service providers from including contractual provisions that interfere with a
physician's ability to communicate with patients about treatment options, alternative plans, or
coverage arrangements); See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6407 (1996) (barring HMOs from
preventing physicians from giving patients information about diagnoses, prognoses, and treatment
options). Congress has yet to act upon legislation prohibiting gag clauses. See 143 CONG. REC.
51734-02, 51745 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1997) (prohibiting contractual provisions that restrict
providers' medical communications with patients).
4. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(a) (West Supp. 1998) (decriminalizing
medicinal marijuana use under California law). Voters in Arizona approved a similar measure in
1996. See Aiz. REV. STAT. ANN., § 13-3412.01 (West Supp. 1997) (amending a statute
criminalizing marijuana to permit use by terminally and seriously ill patients pursuant to a
prescription by a medical practitioner).
5. See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that threats by
federal drug enforcement officials to prosecute physicians for advising patients about the medical
use of marijuana after enactment of the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 violated
physicians' and patients' rights under the First Amendment).
6. A majority of states criminalize assisting another person to commit suicide. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2263 (1997) (listing cases which have found assisting
in suicide to be criminal). Under the common law, a physician's advice about how to commit
suicide amounts to the crime of aiding and abetting a suicide if the advice is given with the
intention that it be used and the patient actually commits suicide. See J.C. SMITH & BRIAN
HOGAN, CRIMINAL LAW 380 (7th ed. 1992). If these requirements are satisfied, a physician's
speech assisting a suicide is not constitutionally protected because the First Amendment generally
does not protect speech utilized to accomplish a crime. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Aim
and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 562, 563 (1989) (stating that
crimes committed through linguistic communication are not protected by the First Amendment);
Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 645 (1980) (stating that the
First Amendment does not cover all linguistically communicative acts).
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The Supreme Court has periodically considered the consti-
tutionality of restrictions on the content of doctor-patient
speech.7 Until recently, however, these provisions, which con-
cerned contraception and abortion, were challenged on the
ground that they violated the constitutional right to privacy8
rather than the free speech rights of patients or doctors.'
In the early 1990s, however, the Rehnquist Court consid-
ered a pair of cases that offered an opportunity to situate doc-
tor-patient speech within First Amendment jurisprudence and to
establish the principle that the Constitution prohibits the federal
government from politicizing the practice of medicine by ma-
nipulating the content of physicians' conversations with pa-
tients. Rust v. Sullivanl" concerned the constitutionality of
regulations promulgated during the Reagan administration"t
7. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989) (consider-
ing and upholding a statute that forbade public employees from counseling a woman to have an
abortion not needed to save her life); Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (invalidating a statute requiring that certain information be given to a woman before she
consents to an abortion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 444-
45 (1983) (invalidating an informed consent provision designed to persuade women not to have
abortions), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 65-67 (1976) (upholding a provision
requiring a woman to give written consent for an abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at
480 (holding a statute prohibiting counseling about contraception and family planning
unconstitutional); Poe v. Ullman, 376 U.S. 497, 498 (1961) (seeking a ruling on the
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives and the giving of advice
regarding their use; the Supreme Court dismissed the case for failing to present a justiciable ques-
tion).
8. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479 (holding that a Connecticut law forbidding the use of
contraceptives intrudes unconstitutionally upon the right of marital privacy) and Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the Constitution does guarantee certain fundamental
areas, or zones, of personal privacy, including a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy up to a
point before the State asserts a compelling state interest).
9. Justices noted the possibility of a First Amendment violation in several of these cases.
See, e.g., City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 472 n.16 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This is not to say that
the informed consent provisions may not violate the First Amendment rights of the physician if
the State requires him or her to communicate its ideology"); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-08 (Black,
J., dissenting) ("I can think of no reasons at this time why [physicians'] expressions of views
would not be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, which guarantee freedom of
speech"); Poe, 367 U.S. at 513 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The right of the doctor to advise his
patients according to his best lights seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need
no extended discussion.").
10. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
11. On January 22, 1993, President Clinton issued a memorandum order directing the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to suspend this rule because it interfered with the
doctor-patient relationship. The Title X "Gag Rule," 58 Fed. Reg. 7455 (1993) (stating that the
Gag Rule endangers women's lives by preventing them from receiving information that their doc-
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that restricted the conduct 2 and speech of physicians working
in family planning clinics funded under Title X of the Public
Health Services Act.' 3 The speech-related regulations prohibit-
ed physicians from providing "counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning" and from provid-
ing referrals to women seeking an abortion.' 4 For patients who
requested referrals, the regulations recommended a pre-scripted
response: "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or
refer for abortion."' 5
In turning its attention to whether these regulations violat-
ed the First Amendment rights of doctors or patients, the Su-
preme Court did not determine whether they were aimed at the
content of expression or whether they were viewpoint-based -
the traditional method for analyzing a First Amendment
claim. 6 Indeed, the Court's opinion contains no First Amend-
ment analysis of the regulations whatsoever. Instead, the
Rehnquist Court skirted the free speech issue entirely, deciding
that the regulations were a constitutional exercise of the
government's power to fund some activities and not others. As
the Court explained, "This is not the case of the Government'suppressing a dangerous idea,' but of a prohibition on a pro-
ject grantee or its employees from engaging in activities out-
side of its scope."' 7 The Court hinted that governmental re-
strictions on doctor-patient speech might violate the Constitu-
tors would otherwise be ethically and morally obligated to provide).
12. The restrictions imposed on the conduct of Title X grantees prohibited lobbying for
legislation that could increase the availability of abortion services, using legal action to make
abortion more available, paying dues to any pro-choice group, and failing to maintain a physical
separation between Title X-funded projects and any abortion-related activities. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 59.9 (1997).
13. 42 U.S.C. Sections 300-300a-6 (1994) (prohibiting the use of funds appropriated for
family planning services in programs where abortion is a method of family planning); 42 C.F.R.
section 59.15 (1997) (restricting disclosure of information about individuals receiving services
except as "necessary to provide services to the patient or as required by law, with appropriate
safeguards for confidentiality").
14. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1997). The regulations also restricted grantees' speech by
prohibiting the dissemination of written materials advocating abortion, and by prohibiting pro-
choice speakers. See also 42 C.F.R. § 59.10 (a) (1997).
15. 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1997).
16. See, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789-94 (2nd
ed. 1988) (explaining the two tracks of analysis for First Amendment claims).
17. Rust, 500 U.S. at 194.
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tion if, for example, doctors were not permitted to disclaim
agreement with the government's opinions, or if the doctor-
patient relationship was sufficiently "all-encompassing" to
justify a patient's expectation of comprehensive medical ad-
vice."
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 9 decided one year after
-Rust, the Court endorsed an even broader governmental right to
manipulate the content of physicians' conversations with pa-
tients.2' Casey challenged the constitutionality of amendments
to a Pennsylvania abortion statute that revived provisions inval-
idated by the Burger Court six years earlier.' In addition to
imposing various limitations on the conduct of all Pennsylvania
physicians who performed abortions,22 the so-called informed
consent provisions required doctors - at the risk of losing
their medical license - to provide every patient seeking an
18. See iaL at 200.
19. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). The plurality opinion was co-authored by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
20. In addition to the authors of the plurality opinion, Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, White,
and Thomas similarly sanctioned the imposition of viewpoint-based restrictions on physician
speech. Id. at 967-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by White,
J., Scalia, J., and Thomas, J.) (allowing states to compel doctors to utter any information to
patients that is relevant and rationally related to legitimate government interest). Only Justices
Stevens and Blackmun rejected this proposition. See id. at 914 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[In order to be legitimate, the State's interest must be secular;, consistent with
the First Amendment the State may not promote a theological or sectarian interest"); and id. at
934-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the state cannot
compel physicians to convey biased information to patients).
21. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986). In Thornburgh, the Burger Court reaffirmed its holding in Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), that government may legitimately require physicians to convey
information to patients to ensure informed consent, but that speech restrictions intended to
influence patients' decision making in accordance with governmental ideology violated the
constitutional right to privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade. d. at 765-67.
22. The statute prohibited a physician from performing an abortion on a married woman
who had not provided the physician with a signed statement that she had notified her husband of
her intention to have an abortion, unless the case fell within one of four exceptions to this
requirement. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (West Supp. 1997). It also prohibited a physician
from performing an abortion less than 24 hours after satisfying the "informed consent" re-
quirements. Id. at § 3205 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997). Any person performing an abortion on a
woman under 18 years old without parental consent was subject to license suspension and civil
action. Id. at § 3206 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997). Finally, the statute required that abortion
facilities file reports showing the total number of abortions performed in each trimester, the age of
each patient, each patient's prior number of pregnancies and abortions, the weight of each aborted
fetus, the marital status of each patient, and, in the case of married parents, whether notice was
provided to the husband. Id. § 3214 (West 1983 & Supp. 1997). The Supreme Court invalidated
the provision requiring spousal notification on the ground that it imposed an undue burden on
women seeking an abortion. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895.
19981
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abortion with certain pre-scripted information intended to con-
vey the State's preference for childbirth over abortion. 3 Like
Rust's "gag rules," the Pennsylvania statute's speech-related
provisions directly regulated the content of physician-patient
discourse for the purpose of influencing patients to make a
medical decision that conformed to government ideology.
In Casey, as in Rust, the Court did not analyze whether
the provisions interfered with the speech rights of physicians or
the audience-based right of patients to receive information.
While the Court tipped its hat to the idea that the challenged
regulations implicated physicians' speech rights, it summarily
dismissed this concern, stating that advising patients is merely
a "part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable li-
censing and regulation by the State."24 Thus, according to
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy, who jointly authored
the plurality opinion, the state's authority to license and regu-
late the medical profession includes the power to compel phy-
sicians to communicate pre-scripted, viewpoint-based state-
ments to patients for the purpose of persuading them to make
the medical choices preferred by the state, as long as those
statements are not false or misleading.'
Taken together, the Rehnquist Court's decisions in Rust
and Casey stand for the troubling proposition that the First
Amendment does not prohibit the federal government from
manipulating the content of physician-patient. speech, in both
publicly and privately financed settings, in order to promote a
particular ideology or to accomplish a policy unrelated to pa-
tient health.
As several commentators noted at the time, both Rust and
Casey are inconsistent with traditional First Amendment juris-
prudence.2 6 It is now apparent that Rust and Casey are also
23. The statute required physicians to tell patients seeking an abortion about the availability
of printed materials that described the fetus and listed agencies that offered alternatives to
abortion; stated that the child's father was liable for financial assistance; and stated that medical
assistance might be available for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care. See PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3205(a)(2)(i)-(iii) (West 1983 & Supp. 1997).
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
25. Id. at 882. Since the Court rooted this authority in the state's power to regulate the
medical profession, the federal government, which lacks this regulatory authority, presumably
does not enjoy the same authority to impose viewpoint-based restrictions on doctor-patient
speech.
26. See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, Abortion Counseling as Vice Activity: The Free Speech
158 [Vol. 8:153
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strikingly inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court's own free
speech jurisprudence, which has largely taken shape since those
decisions were issued. While Rust and Casey suggested that the
Court might adopt a tolerant posture toward speech regulations
promoting government policy, this has not turned out to be
true. Rather, while members of the Rehnquist Court have been
deeply divided about many other issues, they have been unusu-
ally harmonious in First Amendment cases in demanding strict
viewpoint neutrality, and in passionately protecting speakers
and listeners from government paternalism. As a result, doctor-
patient speech exists within the Rehnquist Court's free speech
jurisprudence in a doctrinal wasteland where it is exceptionally
vulnerable to governmental manipulation - more so, in fact,
than significantly less meaningful and valued forms of expres-
sion.
H. VIEWPOINT NEUTRALITY
The central focus of the Rehnquist Court's First Amend-
ment methodology is whether a government regulation is aimed
at the content of expression or whether it is content-neutral.27
Accordingly, the Court generally begins any First Amendment
analysis by determining whether a restriction suppresses or
advances a particular viewpoint or alters the content of the
expression.28 To protect expression from these most heinous
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLuM. L. REv. 1724
(1995) (discussing the Supreme Court's departure from traditional First Amendment analysis in
Rust and Casey); Berg, supra note 3, at 219 (noting that, when considering doctor-patient speech,
the Rehnquist Court has abandoned the First Amendment principle that speech regulations may
not favor one viewpoint over another); Michael Fitzpatrick, Rust Corrodes: The First Amendment
Implications of Rust v. Sullivan, 45 STAN. L. REV. 185, 200 (1992) (discussing how Rust is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's historic intolerance of viewpoint-based restrictions); Janet
Benshoof, The Chastity Act. Government Manipulation of Abortion Information and the First
Amendment, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1916, 1931-33 (1988) (arguing that one-sided presentation of
pregnancy options, as sanctioned by Rust, conflicts with the First Amendment).
27. As Professor Mark Tushnet explains:
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has re-conceptualized free speech law. The
Warren Court began to organize free speech law around a new set of concepts, but the
modem law of the First Amendment crystallized more recently. Today the central
organizing concept of First Amendment doctrine is the distinction between content-
based regulations and content-neutral ones.
Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Its First Amendment Constituency, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 881,
882 (1993) (describing the Supreme Court's changing approach to free speech cases).
28. Unfortunately, the Court's distinction between viewpoint-based and content-based
1998]
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forms of government distortion, regulations that are content- or
viewpoint-based are subject to the "most exacting scrutiny."'2 9
The highly protective nature of this standard is evidenced his-
torically by the consequences of its application. No viewpoint-
based and virtually no content-based restriction of speech has
ever survived strict scrutiny review.3"
There are, however, several exceptions to these rules.
First, while commercial speech may not be restricted on the
basis of viewpoint,3 its content may be regulated subject to a
less demanding intermediate standard of review.32 Though
more generous than that applied to fully protected speech, the
protective nature of this standard is considerable. In the past
five years, its application has led the Court to uphold only one
restriction on the content of commercial speech.33 Indeed, sev-
discrimination has not always been precise. See Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 101 (1996) (stating that "the Court's First Amendment decisions have
ricocheted between a focused emphasis on viewpoint discrimination as the ultimate First
Amendment evil, and broader condemnations of 'content discrimination"').
29. Government restrictions that are content-based must be necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and narrowly drawn to that end. See TRIBE, supra note 17, § 12-13 at 798-99.
30. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 189, 196 (1983) (stating that the Supreme Court "has invalidated almost every content-
based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter century"). But see Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (upholding the constitutionality of a restriction on
political speech within 100 feet of entrance to polling places).
31. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992) (stating that states may not,
for example, single out and regulate commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning
fashion).
32. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (declaring that a state must establish a substantial interest in order to regulate commercial
speech). Under this standard, the State's interests must be substantial, the challenged regulation
must directly and materially advance the interest, and the extent of the speech restriction must be
in reasonable proportion to the interests served. See id. at 564.
33. Since 1992, the Supreme Court has decided seven commercial speech cases, invali-
dating the restrictions in five cases and upholding them in only two. See Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of
Bus. Prof'l. Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (holding that the board of
accountancy's censure of an accountant for referring to herself as a certified financial planner
violated the First Amendment); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (holding that a ban on in-
person solicitations by accountants violated the First Amendment); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,
514 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1995) (holding that a labeling ban on beer prohibiting the display of
alcohol content violated the First Amendment); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996) (holding that a statute prohibiting liquor advertisements by retailers violated the First
Amendment); Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993) (invalidating a ban on
news racks containing commercial handbills). But see Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618 (1995) (upholding a ban on lawyer solicitations of personal injury clients within 30 days of an
accident); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (holding that a federal
statute banning the broadcast of lottery advertisements in states that do not allow lotteries did not
violate the First Amendment).
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eral recent opinions indicate that a majority of courts favor
applying strict scrutiny review to restrictions on most commer-
cial speech."
Additionally, certain categories of "low value" expression
- specifically, obscenity, fighting words, defamatory false-
hoods, and messages advocating imminent lawlessness - may
be more freely regulated without violating the Constitution."
These categories of speech hold this lowly status within First
Amendment jurisprudence because they are viewed as contrib-
uting little to public discourse or the discovery of truth. 6
When considered within this jurisprudential framework,
Rust and Casey relegate doctor-patient speech to a category
outside the protection of the First Amendment along with defa-
mation, obscenity, fighting words, and speech advocating im-
minent lawlessness. Like these types of low-value expression,
doctor-patient speech is exempt from the requirement of view-
point neutrality. Indeed, physician-patient speech is arguably
even less constitutionally protected than these categories of
expression because, according to the Rehnquist Court's deci-
sion in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,37 they may not be regulated on the
basis of viewpoint.38 Also, government restrictions on doctor-
34. See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421-24 (1993)
(stating that intermediate scrutiny should apply to "'core' commercial speech," which does no
more than propose a transaction, while commercial, informational speech, which is related to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience, should be fully protected).
35. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (stating that "a limited categorical approach [for protected
speech] has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence"). Defamation
involving public officials and public figures is reviewed under a more rigorous standard than that
involving private figures. To be liable for defaming a public official or public figure, the
defendant must have known that his or her statement was false or have acted with reckless
disregard of the statement's truth or falsity. See also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (stating that the right to free
expression, while it is a general right, is not an unconditional right and may be regulated under
some circumstances without violating the Constitution). Defamatory falsehoods against private
persons may be proscribed, consistent with the Constitution, if made negligently.
36. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 382 (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942)) (noting that obscenity, fighting words, and defamation may be proscribed
communications because of their "slight social value as a step to truth [and] that any benefit that
may be derived ... is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
37. l at 377.
38. See id at 383-84 (stating that "areas of [low-value] speech can, consistently with the
First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable
content .... [However], they are [not] categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution,




patient speech, like restrictions on low-value expression, need
only satisfy a due process or negligence standard of constitu-
tional review.39
Thus, within the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment
paradigm, doctor-patient speech has less constitutional value
than commercial speech or hate speech. Ironically, a doctor's
television advertisement offering to perform a medical proce-
dure for a fee is more protected than a physician's intimate
conversations with a patient about symptoms, diagnosis, treat-
ments, and the range of other subjects that are often discussed
in the context of this professional relationship.4
With the notable exceptions of Rust and Casey, the
Rehnquist Court has not only faithfully adhered to the require-
ment of viewpoint neutrality, it has been unusually sensitive to
the danger posed by this type of government regulation. In-
deed, the Court has expanded the definition of viewpoint-based
regulation, leading to the invalidation of restrictions that are far
less flagrantly viewpoint-based, and far less likely to lead to
government coercion, than Rust's gag rule or Casey's "in-
formed consent" statute.
For example, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free District," an evangelical church sought permission from
a public school to use its facilities after hours to show a film
series offering a Christian perspective on child rearing and
39. In both Rust and Casey, the Court specifies the types of viewpoint-based regulation of
doctor-patient speech that might be unreasonable, and therefore, unconstitutional. In Rust, the
Court suggested that a viewpoint-based regulation censoring the speech of publicly funded
physicians would violate the First Amendment if the doctors were required to represent the
government's opinions as their own, or if their relationships with patients were sufficiently all-
encompassing to justify the expectation of receiving complete medical advice. See Rust, 500 U.S.
at 200. Under the Casey plurality, viewpoint-based regulations on doctor-patient speech are
unreasonable if physicians are required to utter statements that are false or misleading. Casey, 505
U.S. at 882.
40. Similarly, it is ironic that, under the Rehnquist Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
the railings of anti-abortion protesters (euphemistically referred to as "sidewalk counselors") at
women as they enter an abortion clinic are afforded greater First Amendment protection than the
conversations between these patients and their doctors once inside the medical facility. See
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 117 S.Ct. 855, 864 (1996) (noting that
content-neutral injunctions restricting the time, place, and manner of anti-abortion speech outside
abortion clinics are subject to an intermediate standard of review, insuring that the restriction
serves a significant government interest); accord Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753,
765 (1994) (holding that a content-neutral injunction would be upheld if its challenged provisions
burdened no more speech than necessary to serve significant government interests).
41. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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family problems.42 The school board denied the request on the
ground that its regulations did not expressly authorize the use
of its facilities for religious purposes.43 The school board ar-
gued that its policy of barring all religious groups from using
its facilities was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision
in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational
Fund,;' which distinguished between a restriction controlling
access to a non-public forum based on the subject of the pro-
posed speech or the identity of the proposed speaker, which
was permissible, and viewpoint-based discrimination, which
was not.45 Under Cornelius, the conclusion that a restriction
was viewpoint-based could not be inferred merely from an
exclusion based on subject matter or speaker identity. Rather,
to be deemed impermissibly viewpoint-based, the Court re-
quired evidence that the restriction was intended to deny
"[a]ccess to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he
expresses on an otherwise includible subject."'
In Lamb's Chapel, however, the Court held that the mere
42. See il at 387-88, 388 n.3 (describing the request for permission by the church to show
movies, and listing the movies illustrating Christian perspectives on childrearing).
43. The board's regulations were promulgated in accordance with a New York statute au-
thorizing local boards to adopt regulations for the use of school property for 10 specified
purposes. The list in the statute did not include meetings for religious purposes. The school
board's regulations authorized its facilities to be used only for social, civil, recreational, and
political purposes, which were included as permissible purposes under the statute. See id.
44. 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
45. The Court stated: "Control over access to a nonpublic or limited public forum can be
based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral." Id at 806.
46. IL (emphasis added). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) (explaining that "[tihe government's purpose is the controlling consideration" in deciding
whether a speech restriction is content-based or content-neutral). The Rehnquist Court continues
to send mixed messages about the role of motive in assessing the constitutionality of content-
based regulations. For example, in Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994), which
was decided one year after Lamb's Chapel, the Court endorsed the notion that governmental
purpose is the key to determining whether a regulation is viewpoint-based or viewpoint-neutral.
The Court stated: "That petitioners all share the same viewpoint regarding abortion does not in
itself demonstrate that some invidious content- or viewpoint-based purpose motivated the
issuance of the order." Id. at 763. Ambivalence about the role of motive in assessing the
constitutionality of government regulation of speech is not new. See Robert Post, Recuperating
First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1268 (1995) ("There is a pervasive ambiguity
as to whether courts are to assess the justification for a regulation [the reasons that can be adduced
for its passage] or the motivation for a regulation [the actual psychological intentions of those who
enacted it]. These are very different inquiries, and yet the Court has persistently equivocated as to
which it means to require."). For a compelling argument in favor of inquiring into governmental
motive, see generally Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CI. L. REV. 413 (1996).
1998]
HEALTH MATRIX
fact that the school board's regulations had the effect of ex-
cluding the entire subject of religion from the list of permitted
uses was itself sufficient to demonstrate that the restriction
constituted "overt, viewpoint-based discrimination" in violation
of the First Amendment.47  Similarly, in Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,48 the Court
held that the decision of the publicly funded University of
Virginia to deny a religious student organization's request for
school funds violated the organization's free speech rights.49
As in Lamb's Chapel, the basis for the exclusion was the sub-
ject of the speech (religion) not the particular religious view-
point (Christian) that the organization sought to express. Nev-
ertheless, the Court deemed the university's decision not to
fund all religious expression impermissible viewpoint discrimi-
nation, despite the absence of evidence of any intent to dis-
criminate against or promote a particular religious view-
point.5
It is difficult to reconcile the Rehnquist Court's concern
about the danger of viewpoint-based regulations in Lamb's
Chapel and Rosenberger with its lack of appreciation for the
pernicious effect of viewpoint-based restrictions on doctor-pa-
tient speech."1 Patients are especially vulnerable to undue in-
fluence from government-dictated, viewpoint-based messages
delivered by their physicians. Studies continue to show that
patients are largely passive and deferential within the structure
of the doctor-patient relationship,52 and that doctors may re-
spond badly when patients attempt to participate actively in
47. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 34347 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment).
48. 515 U.S. 819, 84245 (1995) (holding that the university's denial of funding to print a
Christian student newspaper amounted to unlawful viewpoint discrimination).
49. The petitioners challenged the university's decision on the ground that it violated their
rights under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The university denied a free speech
violation and argued additionally that its decision to grant the students' request for funding would
have run afoul of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. See id. at 819-20. A majority
of the Court rejected the university's Establishment Clause argument. Md at 819-21.
50. See id. at 831.
51. For an analysis of the possible negative impact on patients and medical decision
making of viewpoint-based restrictions on physician speech, see Berg, supra note 2, at 225-31.
52. See Debra L. Roter et. al., Communication Patterns of Primary Care Physicians, 277
JAMA 350,355 (1997) (reporting that 66% of physician visits studied were physician-dominated,
narrowly focused on biomedical concerns, and characterized by low levels of patient control over
communication).
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conversations. 3 All patients, especially those who are poor,
uneducated, young, elderly, and/or members of racial and eth-
nic minorities have considerable difficulty asking questions and
challenging physicians' authority. 4 Moreover, there is evi-
dence that managed care may further constrain patients' ability
to question or challenge physicians." As a result, when con-
fronted with the expression of a viewpoint about a preferred
medical treatment that carries with it the considerable weight
of the State and a physician, it is likely that patients will re-
spond with silence, timidity, confusion, and deference.
1I. SPEAKER AUTONOMY
In addition to being acutely sensitive to the danger of
viewpoint-based regulations, the Rehnquist Court has, since
Rust and Casey, been fiercely protective of speaker autonomy,
particularly in the area of negative speech rights.56 Indeed, the
Court has often discussed the bar against government-com-
pelled speech, particularly when ideologically based, in abso-
lute terms. For example, Justice Souter, the author of the plu-
53. One recent British study found that a majority of doctors had a negative opinion of
patients who bring written lists of concerns to medical consultations, describing them as
"obsessional," "neurotic," "manipulative," and "authoritarian." See J. Middleton, Written Lists in
the Consultation: Attitudes of General Practitioners to Lists and the Patients Who Bring Them, 44
BRrr. J. GEN. PRAC. 309 (1994) (concluding that it is necessary to overcome doctors' negative
stereotypes of patients and advocating the use of written lists to improve communication between
doctors and patients).
54. See Sherrie H. Kaplan et. al., Patient and Visit Characteristics Related to Physicians'
Participatory Decision-Making Style, 33 MED. CARE 1176, 1182-84 (1995) (interpreting data
suggesting that patients over 75 and under 40 exhibit less assertive conversational behaviors [such
as question-asking, interrupting, and asserting opinions] than middle-aged patients); P.N. Butow
et al., Computer-based Interaction Analysis of the Cancer Consultation, 71 BRIT. J. CANCER
1115, 1118 (1995) (patients asked an average of 5.6 questions and spoke for less than 25% of 30-
minute cancer consultations). See also Berg, supra note 2, at 227 n.133 (listing several articles
discussing research showing that "patients rarely ask questions during conversations with
physicians or take control of topics that are discussed").
55. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient
Relationship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 328 (1995) (discussing the effects that
productivity requirements imposed by managed care organizations may have on opportunities for
physician-patient communication); Kaplan et al., supra note 55, at 1185 (presenting data
indicating that short office visits are associated with decreased patient participation in
conversations with physicians).
56. The term "negative speech rights" refers to the right not to be compelled to speak. See
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1976) ("The right of freedom of thought protected by the
First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to
refrain from speaking at all").
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rality opinion in Casey, recently stated:
Although the State may at times 'prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in commercial advertising' by requiring the dissemination
of 'purely factual and uncontroversial information' . . outside
that context it may not compel affirmance of a belief with
which the speaker disagrees .... Indeed, this general rule that
the speaker has the right to tailor the speech, applies not only to
expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, but equally to
statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.57
This heightened intolerance of restrictions on negative
speech rights has led the Court to invalidate regulations that
are far less constraining of speaker autonomy than those it
upheld in Rust and Casey. For example, in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission,8 a pamphleteer challenged a fine im-
posed by the Ohio Elections Commission for distributing an
anonymous leaflet in connection with a referendum on a pro-
posed school tax levy. The fine was assessed in accordance
with a state statute that required persons producing campaign
literature to identify themselves.59 The state argued that the
statute's mandated disclosure requirement facilitated informed
political decision making and maintained the integrity of the
electoral process, a rationale strikingly similar to that proffered
by the state to justify the compelled speech requirement in
Casey.'
In deeming the fine unconstitutional, Justice Souter, writ-
ing for the majority, firmly grounded the Court's holding in the
personal liberty theory of the First Amendment,61 stating that"an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other deci-
sions concerning omissions or additions to the content of publi-
57. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
573 (1995) (finding that a state court's application of a civil rights law to require organizers of a
St. Patrick's Day parade to admit a contingent of gay and lesbian marchers violated the
organizers' First Amendment rights).
58. 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that Ohio's statutory prohibition against the distribution
of any anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amendment).
59. Id. at 338 n.3 (citing OnHO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (A) (1988) (repealed 1995)).
60. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341 ("Ohio maintains that the statute under review is a
reasonable regulation of the electoral process").
61. For a general discussion of the personal liberty theory of the First Amendment, see C.
EDWIN BAKER, HumAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 24 (1989) ("MFireedom of speech
may be defensible, not because of the marketplace of ideas' supposed capacity to discover truth,
but because freedom of speech embodies respect for the liberty or autonomy and responsibility of
the participants").
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cation, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment."62 Speaker autonomy is unconstitutionally
constrained, according to Justice Souter, even when govern-
ment compels an individual to speak or write something as
seemingly innocuous and viewpoint-neutral as his or her own
name.63
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual
Group of Boston,' the Court again invalidated a state restric-
tion that infringed upon speaker autonomy in a far more atten-
uated way than the regulations at issue in Rust and Casey.
Hurley dealt with the constitutionality of a Massachusetts
court's ruling ordering the organizers of a St. Patrick's Day
parade to admit a contingent of gay and lesbian marchers. The
state court had ruled that a parade is not expression, but is
rather an event subject to a law barring discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations.65 The
Supreme Court disagreed. Again, Justice Souter, this time
writing for a unanimous Court, held that the state court order
violated the "fundamental rule of protection under the First
Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the
content of his own message. '
When considered in light of the plurality opinion in Casey,
Justice Souter's opinions in McIntyre and Hurley are rather re-
markable. First, the State undoubtedly offends speaker autono-
my by compelling individuals to sign their names to a leaflet
when they would otherwise choose not to. However, a far more
substantial infringement of speaker autonomy occurs when, as
in Rust and Casey, individuals are compelled to speak when
they would otherwise choose to remain silent, and are com-
pelled to express a viewpoint not their own. While permitting
physician/speakers to disclaim agreement with the
government's message may lessen the regulation's coercive
62. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 340.
63, See iii at 342 (declaring interest in having published materials enter the marketplace of
ideas outweighs need for disclosure of the anonymous author's identity).
64. 515 U.S. 557 (1995) (limiting state's right to alter expressive content of parade on
grounds of First Amendment protection).
65. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 563 (stating that the state court "concluded that the parade is not an
exercise of [the Council's] constitutionally protected right of expressive association ...").
66. id at 573.
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effect on listeners, a disclaimer does not diminish the distortion
of the speaker's mental process, or autonomy in determining
the content of his or her expression.
Furthermore, the court-ordered inclusion of a group of gay
and lesbian marchers in a St. Patrick's Day parade in Hurley is
far less constraining of speaker autonomy than the measures at
issue in Rust and Casey. Hurley's court order did not require
any alteration in the words spoken by any individual, nor did it
interfere with the thinking or expression of any speaker.67
Rather, by requiring the inclusion of a government-selected
group in a parade (which already included such diverse con-
tingents as those protesting the presence of England in North-
ern Ireland and those opposed to illegal drugs), the government
altered the context or form of the organizers' expression, while
leaving alone the thinking and speech of individual partici-
pants.68 This far more mediated interference with individual
speech, thought, and autonomy was nevertheless deemed un-
constitutional by a unanimous Court.
The Rehnquist Court's failure to perceive an unacceptable
infringement on physicians' speech rights in Rust and Casey
may, as one commentator has approvingly suggested, rest upon
its acceptance of the proposition that speaker autonomy is not
implicated unless the expression involved originates in the
intentions and free communicative will of an individual.69 Ac-
cording to this theory, since physician speech about diagnosis
and treatment is shaped by the norms of the medical profes-
sion, it is the profession, and not the individual doctor, that is
the speaker.70 Viewed from this perspective, the measures at
67. The Supreme Court describes the interference as "intimately connected with the
communication advanced ... " rather than as an infringement of individual speech or thought. Id.
at 576.
68. "Wie use the word 'parade' to indicate marchers who are making some sort of col-
lective point, not just to each other but to bystanders along the way .... Parades are thus a form
of expression, not just motion . L... Id. at 568 (citations omitted).
69. See Randall P. Bezanson, Institutional Speech, 80 IOWA L. REV. 735, 765 (1995)
(describing speech that belongs to no individual and is not "traceable to the speech intentions of
other natural persons" as not protected from government regulation under the First Amendment).
70. There is language in Casey to support Professor Bezanson's view that the Court views
professional speech as having an attenuated connection to First Amendment values because it is
shaped by professional norms. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (referring to a physician's First
Amendment right not to speak as "only a part of the practice of medicine... "). However, more
recently, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, seemed to take the opposite view in stating
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issue in Rust and Casey do not infringe upon speaker/physician
autonomy, because doctors lack free choice in determining the
content of their conversations with patients.
However, the conclusion that physician speech rights are
not at stake in conversations with patients rests upon several
highly questionable premises. First, the claim that the norms of
the medical profession supplant physician autonomy during
conversations with patients is overstated. The content of physi-
cian speech is certainly influenced (one hopes) by the ethical
standards of the medical profession, and parts of it, particularly
those regarding diagnosis and treatment, may at times be whol-
ly determined by the science of medicine. Nonetheless, it is
individual physicians, and not the medical profession, who
retain the ultimate authority in determining what to say to
patients and whether to speak at all. This balance of power
between individual doctors and the profession is reflected in
the therapeutic exception to the doctrine of informed consent,
under which physicians may remain silent about a patient's
condition or a treatment alternative if they reasonably believe
that speaking would cause the patient harm.71
Additionally, the view that speaker autonomy is not impli-
cated unless speech is entirely a product of individual free will
is grounded in an overly atomistic and decontextualized con-
cept of autonomy. An individual's decision about what words
to utter when communicating with another human being is
always influenced, to varying degrees, by existing social rela-
tions and roles, by cultural and institutional norms, and by the
that the speech of professionals in the context of a professional relationship is fully protected by
the First Amendment. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634 (1995) ("Speech by
professionals obviously has many dimensions. There are circumstances in which we will accord
speech by attorneys on public issues and matters of legal representation the strongest protection
our Constitution has to offer"). This inconsistency suggests that the plurality opinion in Casey, of
which Justice O'Connor was a co-author, was not driven by a general First Amendment theory of
professional speech, but by the fact that the physician speech at issue in that case concerned the
contentious subject of abortion. See footnote 95, infra, and accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,788-89 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (recognizing an
exception to the duty of informed consent if the physician reasonably concludes that the
disclosure of risks would threaten a patient's well-being); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 676, 683
(Haw. Ct. App. 1995), (recognizing that risk information may be withheld if detrimental to
patients under the therapeutic exception to informed consent) modified on other grounds by 903
P.2d 667 (Haw. 1995) (establishing an objective standard for informed consent in Hawaii); N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(d) (McKinney 1993) (stating exception to the duty of informed
consent if physician reasonably believes that disclosure would adversely affect patient).
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ideas and expectations of others. Very little human expression
would qualify for First Amendment protection if it had to be
free of the influence of intellectual disciplines, social relations,
and institutional norms.72
Finally, Casey's conclusion that physician speech should
be deprived of full First Amendment protection because "it is
subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State"
turns traditional First Amendment methodology on its head. 7
Rather than focusing on the necessity of limiting speech under
certain circumstances, the traditional method for determining
whether speech is protected in the first instance is to assess
whether the expression facilitates First Amendment values. It is
the function of the constitutional standard of review to protect
the speech when it facilitates those values, and to permit gov-
ernment regulation in those exceptional instances when those
values are outweighed by the expression's negative impact.
IV. LISTENER AUTONOMY
Since Rust and Casey, the Rehnquist Court has, as a gen-
eral matter, presumed that listeners are capable of defining, and
therefore ought to be free to define, their own communicative
needs and interests.74 Consequently, the Court has been highly
circumspect when considering regulations that are justified on
the ground that a State-structured dialogue is needed to protect
listeners' informational needs. In the absence of empirical
supporting evidence, the Rehnquist Court has consistently re-
jected the argument that a regulation is necessary to safeguard
audience-based interests.
The Rehnquist Court's reverence toward listener autonomy
is most apparent in a series of commercial speech cases illus-
trated by Edenfield v. Fane.75 Here, the Court considered the
72. For an argument that speech should be protected precisely because of its relationship to
social structures and relations, see Post, supra note 46, at 1250 (asserting that the constitutional
value of speech inheres not in speech itself, but in particular social practices facilitated by speech).
73. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884.
74. The Rehnquist Court recently strongly endorsed the principle that the First Amendment
protects the audience-based right to receive information. See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) ("[A]ssuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources is a governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central
to the First Amendment").
75. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (holding that a
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constitutionality of a Florida ban on in-person solicitations by
accountants. The state argued that the ban was necessary to
protect consumers from fraud and overreaching by accountants
eager for new clients. The state did not, however, offer any
evidence to support this claim. The Court held that the state's
unsupported "suppositions" about the inability of consumers to
judge for themselves the appropriateness of the accountants'
speech was insufficient to justify the regulation.76
Since Rust and Casey, the Rehnquist Court has upheld
only one regulation that was justified on the ground that it was
needed to protect audience-based interests.77 In this case, how-
ever, which involved a ban on the use of direct mail by per-
sonal injury lawyers soliciting new clients, the state produced a
lengthy empirical study demonstrating that the public did in
fact need government protection from this speech.7"
In contrast to this line of commercial speech cases, neither
Rust nor Casey analyzes the restrictions from the standpoint of
their infringement on the audience-based, informational inter-
ests of listeners. Instead, these opinions, insofar as they are
concerned with speech rights at all, focus on the impact of the
regulations on physicians' speech rights.7 9
Moreover, both opinions take a highly paternalistic attitude
toward the audience-based interests of patients by assuming
that they lack the capacity to assess their own informational
needs. In the view of the Casey plurality, a woman's "mature
statute prohibiting liquor advertisements by retailers violated the First Amendment); Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 483-84 (1995) (holding that a labeling ban on beer prohibiting
the display of alcohol content violated the First Amendment); Ibanez v. Florida Dept. of Bus.
Prof I Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (reversing a lower court's finding
that the Florida Board of Accountancy properly reprimanded an accountant for advertising her
credentials as CPA and CFP in her commercial communications concerning her law practice, and
finding a violation of her First Amendment rights); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
(holding that a ban on in-person solicitations by accountants violated the First Amendment).
76. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (noting that the State produced no studies or anecdotal
evidence to support the assumption that consumers would be misled or overwhelmed by in-person
solicitations by CPAs).
77. See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (holding that the Florida Bar
has a "substantial interest both in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims"
and remarking that studies show that "the harms targeted by the ban are quite real").
78. Florida Bar, 515 U.S. at 618 (stating that the study summary contained both statistical
and anecdotal data supporting the Florida Bar's position).
79. For a more extensive analysis of Rust and Casey from the standpoint of patients'
audience-based rights under the First Amendment, see Berg, supra note 2, at 219-31.
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and informed" decision about whether to continue a pregnancy
to term can be ensured only if the State structures the doctor-
patient dialogue, mandates the communication of certain infor-
mation, and compels the expression of the State's preference
for childbirth over abortion immediately before the procedure
is performed.8" Unlike its approach in commercial speech cas-
es, the Court in Casey did not demand proof that pregnant
women seeking an abortion lack this information or themselves
consider it relevant to their decision."
The dissonance between the Rehnquist Court's rejection of
unproved assumptions to justify restrictions on commercial
speech and its acceptance of unproved assumptions to justify
restrictions on doctor-patient speech in Rust and Casey may be
yet another example of a long-standing tradition of distrusting
women's capacity for rational decision making, particularly in
the area of reproduction.82 For example, rather than mandating
disclosure of information about the risks and benefits of par-
ticipating in medical research and then permitting pregnant
women to make their own decisions, the law has summarily
excluded them from such participation." Similarly, New York
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 ("[Wle permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting
the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in doing so the State expresses a preference for childbirth over abortion").
81. One commentator has concluded that the available evidence does not support the
conclusion of the State and the Court that women need the information mandated by the
"informed consent" statute in Casey. See Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the
Woman's Decisionmaking Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTs. J. 787, 817-18 (1996) (stating
that evidence from the tort system and Reagan Administration study do not support the conclusion
that women do not understand the "moral" or psychological risks of abortion prior to undergoing
the procedure).
82. Several commentators have observed that a distrust for women's capacity for rational
decision making is apparent in reproduction jurisprudence. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition
of Reproduction, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 453, 463 (1995) (stating that "woman has been judged
historically as incapable of rational thought" and "[t]he pervasiveness of this tradition throughout
religion, philosophy, science, and ultimately law, distorts modem day cultural and legal
evaluation of women's reproductive autonomy"); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the
Womb, 43 DuKE L.J. 492 (1993) (exploring the different ways in which the medical and legal
professions approach women's reproductive choices and the willingness of courts to intervene in
women's choices).
83. A number of legal scholars have analyzed the problem of gender bias in clinical re-
search and the law. See, e.g., Karen H. Rothenberg, Gender Matters: Implications for Clinical
Research and Women's Health Care, 32 HOUS. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1996) (explaining that in
clinical practice "the majority of drugs have never been tested on pregnant women, primarily
because of fetal protection policies that prohibit the inclusion of women of childbearing potential
in most drug trials"); Vanessa Merton, The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-
Pregnable People (a.ka. Women) from Biomedical Research, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 369 (1993)
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recently enacted, and many states are considering, legislation
that supplants new mothers' authority to decide whether to test
their newborns for HIV.' These measures, which mandate the
testing of all newborns and the disclosure of the results,85 rest
upon the unproven assumption that new mothers cannot be
trusted to make a rational decision about testing their babies
for HIV even if fully informed about the benefits of learning
their infant's HIV status.
V. THE FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF
DOCTOR-PATIENT SPEECH
Since the time of Hippocrates, the highest ethical duty of
physicians has been to regard the interests of patients as para-
mount to those of all others, including the State.86 A patient-
centered medical ethic does more than facilitate the identifica-
tion and satisfaction of the health care needs of individual
patients; it also creates a crucial boundary between the State
and the practice of medicine. In doing so, it serves several
important functions: it protects the medical decision making of
patients from governmental coercion; it protects the intellectual
freedom of physicians to practice their profession according to
their best judgment; and, equally important, it safeguards the
integrity of medicine from the potentially corrupting effects of
a State agenda.8
(arguing that stereotypes about women underlie, and are reinforced by, gender-based exclusionary
criteria for biomedical research); L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women
in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap,
45 VAND. L. REV. 877 (1992) (analyzing the "history and ramifications of exclusion of women
from clinical trials").
84. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 1997-98) (ordering creation of a
program to deal with problems associated with HIV-positive newborns). In 1996, Congress
amended the Ryan White CARE Act of 1990, which provides funds for AIDS-related services and
treatment, to include financial incentives for states to adopt mandatory HIV testing of all
newborns and the disclosure of the results. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-37 (West Supp. 1997) (allowing
disqualified states to receive grant money if they establish mandatory HIV testing).
85. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 1997-98) (creating a program to
test newborns for HIV).
86. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 716-717 (25th ed. 1990).
87. We need not speculate about what can come to pass when the allegiance of doctors
shifts from their patients to the State. In the 1930s and '40s, German physicians were taught that
they owed a higher duty to the health of the State than to the health of their patients. The
substitution of State policy for a patient-based medical ethic led substantial numbers of German
doctors to lend their support to the Nazi agenda and its theories of racial superiority, and to
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While the Constitution includes several provisions that,
like the patient-centered teaching of Hippocrates, shield a
sphere of individual liberty against government infiltration,
none of these is more towering than the First Amendment. By
prohibiting the State from distorting speech, the First Amend-
ment aspires to insure that the formation of belief about all
matters related to the "intellect and spirit"88 occurs within a
free and unfettered context. To achieve this aim, the First
Amendment protects both positive and negative speech rights
- the right to speak, the right not to speak, the right to receive
ideas by listening to others, and the right not to be compelled
to listen to unwanted speech.89 As one First Amendment
scholar has stated: "Freedom of expression . .. supports a
mature individual's sovereign autonomy in deciding how to
communicate with others; it disfavors restrictions on communi-
cation imposed for the sake of the distorting rigidities of the
orthodox and the established."'
A dispassionate application of established First Amend-
ment doctrine in Rust and Casey would have led the Rehnquist
Court to conclude that doctor-patient speech is protected ex-
pression that cannot be regulated on the basis of viewpoint.9"
participate in the sterilization and extermination of "undesirable" patients. See Jeremiah A.
Barondess, Medicine Against Society: Lessons From the Third Reich, 276 JAMA 1657, 1658-61
(1996) (describing the restructuring of the German medical profession and the consequences of its
transformation into an arm of State policy).
88. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,715 (1977) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) to determine that requiring a motorist to display the motto
"Live Free or Die" invaded the sphere of the intellect and spirit [protected by] the First
Amendment").
89. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976) ("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists... the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."); Wooley,
430 U.S. 705, 714 ("The right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against
state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.");
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970) (noting that the
Constitution does not compel citizens to listen to or view unwanted communications, including
those sent by mail); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (stating that "[i]t is now well
established that the Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas").
90. David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the
FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45,62 (1974).
91. I have argued elsewhere that doctor-patient speech is protected under the First
Amendment because it is intimately connected to patients' autonomy and audience-based interests
in receiving information. See Berg supra note 2, at 221-3 1. For alternative theories for protecting
doctor-patient speech, see Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 174 (1996) (ar-
guing that the First Amendment prohibits viewpoint-based regulation of medical counseling
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Affording First Amendment protection to doctor-patient speech
would not altogether displace the right of government to im-
pose some content-based regulations. Informed consent require-
ments, for example, would survive even the most exacting
standard of review because they are viewpoint-neutral and
serve the compelling state interest of facilitating informed
medical decision making.92 Additionally, unlike the paternal-
istic rationale advanced to support the viewpoint-based disclo-
sure requirements in Casey, there is extensive historical and
empirical evidence supporting patients' need for governmental
intervention to prevent coerced medical decisions by insuring
that doctors communicate complete information about diagnosis
and alternative treatments. 93 Indeed, the evidence supporting
the need for informed consent requirements is as compelling as
that deemed sufficient by the Rehnquist Court to justify a con-
tent-based regulation of political speech in Burson v. Free-
man.94
The Rehnquist Court's highly protective free speech juris-
prudence since Rust and Casey supports the thesis, advanced
by some at the time,95 that the constitutional protection of
because "patients expect the independent judgment of physicians to trump inconsistent managerial
demands"); Goldstein, supra note 81, at 853 (arguing that the First Amendment protects doctor-
patient speech because of "substantial individual and societal interests in physicians' free
speech"). For an argument reaching the opposite conclusion, see Bezanson, supra note 69, at 766
(describing physician speech as "representational speech" not protected by the First Amendment).
92. For another formulation of a standard of review for restrictions on doctor-patient
speech specifically designed to protect patients' First Amendment right to receive unbiased
medical advice, see Berg, supra note 3, at 260-65.
93. For a history of the doctrine of informed consent, see generally PAUL S. APPELBAUM
Er. AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987); RUTH R. FADEN
& TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (in collaboration with
Nancy M.P. King 1986) (exploring the origin and nature of informed consent, concentrating on
conceptual issues, particularly the conditions under which informed consent is obtained). See also
JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).
94. 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (plurality opinion) (holding that a Tennessee statute restricting
political campaigning near the entrance to polling places did not violate the First Amendment). Of
particular relevance to the plurality in Burson was the extensive history of voter intimidation and
the widespread existence of state statutes limiting polling place speech. Id. at 200-04. It is
similarly well-established that physicians have historically deprived patients of accurate and
complete information about diagnosis and alternative treatments, and thereby undermined the
voluntariness of medical decisions. To address this problem, every state imposes informed
consent requirements on physicians either as a matter of common law or by statute. For an analy-
sis of the various types of informed consent requirements, see Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 916-17 (1994).
95. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 2, at 219 (stating that "[w]hile one suspects that the Court's
conclusions in these cases reflect the majority's views on the highly volatile subject of abortion,
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doctor-patient speech was forfeited to accommodate profound
disagreements about the practice of abortion among the Court's
members.96 Unfortunately, it is doubtful that this distortion of
free speech jurisprudence will be remedied in the near future.
If history is any indication, prospective Supreme Court chal-
lenges to government regulation of doctor-patient speech are
likely to involve measures requiring physicians to utter increas-
ingly pointed statements opposing abortion,97 or to express the
State's viewpoint concerning some other highly controversial
medical practice about which members of the Court are likely
to disagree.98 Indeed, the most recent First Amendment chal-
the Court did not limit its holdings to this narrow context"); Wells, supra note 26, at 1724 (ar-
guing that "[iln its hurry to dismantle abortion rights... the Court also pulled apart the
fundamental tenets of the First Amendment").
96. It has also recently become apparent that Justice Souter's sanctioning of the imposition
of viewpoint-based regulations on physician speech may be an aspect of a larger theory that
doctors' professional roles appropriately include overseeing patients' moral health. See
Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. 2258,2288 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that "the
good physician is not just a mechanic of the human body whose services have no bearing on a
person's moral choices, but one who does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the
patient").
97. For example, in 1975, Illinois enacted a statute that required physicians to inform
patients that "[t]he State of llinois wants you to know that in its view the child you are carrying is
a living human being whose life should be preserved. Illinois strongly encourages you not to have
an abortion but to go through to childbirth." ILL. ST. CH. 38 §§ 81-23.5(1975), repealed by P.A.
83-1128, § 2 (1984) (text of repealed statute is reprinted in part in Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772,
781 n.13 (7th Cir. 1980) While this statute was held to violate the First Amendment at the time, it
could survive constitutional review today under the standard set forth in Casey.
98. State statutes patterned on the Pennsylvania statute in Casey requiring physicians to
communicate to patients the government's ideological opposition to abortion have been generally
upheld. See, e.g., Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994)
(upholding a statute that requires the physician or physician's agent to inform a woman seeking an
abortion that medical assistance benefits may be available, that the father is liable for child
support, and that she has a right to review printed materials describing the fetus and listing
abortion alternatives); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995) (upholding a
district court ruling striking a parental notification provision because it failed to provide a
"parental bypass mechanism," and also holding that South Dakota may constitutionally require
physicians to provide patients with certain information 24 hours before performing an abortion),
cert. denied sub nom., Jamkow v. Planned Parenthood, 116 S.Ct. 1582 (1996); Utah Women's
Clinic, Inc. v. Leavitt, 844 F.Supp. 1482 (D.Utah 1994) (deciding that a Utah abortion statute
requiring informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period was unconstitutional). However, on July
2, 1997, a Florida state court judge enjoined the implementation of the "Women's Right to Know
Act," which mandated that physicians convey viewpoint-based information to patients seeking an
abortion. The plaintiffs asserted that the bill violated a woman's constitutional right to privacy,
due process, and equal protection in requiring "the physician to be... an arm of the state in
advising his patient.., and forces the physician to steer his patient in favor of parenthood
regardless of his true beliefs about the best interest of his patient and the expressed desire of his
patient, who has come to him for an abortion." Judge Enjoins Implementation of Abortion Right to
Know Law, 6 BNA HEALTH L. REP., 1091, 1091 (1997) (quoting from complaint in the case).
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lenge to a government restriction on doctor-patient speech
concerned the contentious issue of the medicinal use of
marijuana.' One can only hope, therefore, that the next time
the Rehnquist Court confronts a viewpoint-based regulation of
physician-patient speech, it will hold its nose and adhere to the
dictates of the First Amendment, which, above all else, protects
expression regarding practices or subjects that some condemn.
99. See Conant v. McCaffrey, 172 F.R.D. 681 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that threats by
federal drug enforcement officials to prosecute physicians for advising patients about medical
uses of marijuana after enactment of the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 violated
physicians' and patients' rights under the First Amendment).
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